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IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION: A NEW
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
After having been physically assaulted while on an international charter flight, Vern Chumney brought a private civil action against his attackers seeking damages. 1 Chumney
contended that the passengers who committed the attack had
violated the federal statute which provides criminal penalties
for assaults occurring on any aircraft within the special aircraft
jurisdiction of the United States. 2 This statute, however, makes
no provision for a private action seeking damages. Thus,
Chumney's complaint raised the issue of whether a private
cause of action can be implied from a statute which provides
criminal penalties but does not expressly provide for civil re3
lief.
The theory of implying a cause of action from a federal criminal or regulatory statute was recognized in 1916 by the United
States Supreme Court,4 but it has since developed on a case by
case basis without a clear analytical framework.5 Recently the
Supreme Court undertook to articulate a workable formula to
ascertain when a cause of action may be implied. 6 Through an
analysis and integration of the signifigant implied cause of action cases, a new analytical framework can be developed. This
framework can then be applied to the question proffered by
Chumney's complaint-whether a private cause of action can be
implied from the aircraft assault statute.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION

The Statutory Tort Principle
The origin of implied causes of action in the United States
dates back to Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby.7 The issue
1. Chumney v. Nixon, 615 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1980).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1976). The jurisdictional statute is 18 U.S.C. § 7
(1976).
3. Chief Judge Edwards noted that the question of implying a private
cause of action from a criminal statute is a difficult one to answer. For an
excellent history on the theory of implied causes of action, see McMahon &
Rodos, Judicial Implication of Private Causes of Action: Reappraisaland
Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REV. 167 (1976).
4. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
5. See, e.g., Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash:
Some Implicationsfor Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392 (1975).
6. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc.
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
7. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
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before the Supreme Court in Rigsby concerned the effect legislative enactments had on the legal relationships between people
within the purview of a statute. 8 The plaintiff maintained that if
a statute created certain duties owed by one group of people to
another group, then it would follow that an injured member of
the group to which a duty was owing could bring a civil action
for damages based upon the violation of the legislative command. 9 The Supreme Court stated that if the harm caused was
of the type that the legislative provision was intended to prevent, then implying a private cause of action on behalf of an injured party was irresistible. 10 The Court in Rigsby held that
"disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act; and
where it results in damage to one of the class for whose benefit
the statute was enacted, the right to recover damages from the
party in default is implied ....
11
A ConstitutionalBasis
It has been advanced that the Rigsby Court stepped beyond
the boundaries of the judicial branch of government by, in effect,
taking upon itself the enactment of an additional remedial provision in a statute passed by Congress. 12 Such condemnation of
8. Despite the fact that authorities frequently cite Rigsby as the earliest American case where a civil remedy was implied from violation of a
penal statute, the language and the facts of the case are sufficiently ambiguous to suggest that the case really only involved the application of the wellestablished doctrine of negligence per se, where the statute merely sets the
standard of conduct by which a reasonable, prudent man would abide. This
view of Rigsby is supported by the fact that the case was decided under the
regime of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) where federal courts were
free to create substantive standards of liability applicable to a common law
negligence claim. Such a challenge to the stature of Rigsby as the first implied cause of action case has now become academic because the courts
have often used the language of the case to support the implied rights doctrine where negligence per se was not involved. See generally Gamm & Eisberg, The Implied Rights Doctrine,41 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 292 (1972).
9. This argument was an adoption of the legal analysis used in the
English case of Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (P.B. 1854). The theoretical framework for the doctrine is not new. Over two hundred years ago,
Blackstone noted that "[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law,
whenever that right is invaded." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23.
10. 241 U.S. at 40.
11. Id. at 39.
12. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Justice Powell's position, that the doctrine of implied rights is
unconstitutional, would be accurate if federal courts were only applying the
common law doctrine of negligence per se. According to the doctrine of
negligence per se, a legislative enactment may establish the standard of
conduct expected of a particular person in a particular situation. Liability
will be imputed under negligence per se without the necessity of ascertain-
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judicial activism in implying causes of action was predicated
upon superficial reasoning. When a legislature declares certain
conduct to be unlawful, it not only creates a duty owed to the
public at large, but also affects the relationships between groups
of people who are the intended beneficiaries of the statute.
Therefore, failure of a court to imply a cause of action on the
behalf of a beneficiary of a statute would be tantamount to judicial approval of conduct condemned as wrong by the legislature. 13 Such inaction by a court would be irreconcilable with the
proper respect due to a co-equal branch of government. The
court, in effect, would render duty-creating language in a statute
merely laudatory.
In addition to the acknowledgement of the mutual respect
for co-equal branches of government, the Rigsby Court relied
upon the concept of stare decisis to support the practice of implying causes of action from federal statutes. The Court stated
that the practice was merely an application of the maxim ubi jus
ibi remedium-where there is a right there is a remedy. In the
landmark decision Marbury v. Madison,14 Chief Justice Marshall proclaimed that the maxim occupies such a fundamental
place in American jurisprudence as to be deemed the very "essence of civil liberty." 15 Since statutes tend to create new rights,
frequently unknown at common law, the Constitution seems to
mandate their judicial recognition and enforcement by the
means of implying private causes of action.
ing the standard of care of the fictitious "reasonable man," assuming that
the other elements--duty, causation, and injury-are also present.
There is, however, an essential distinction between negligence per se
and an implied cause of action. Under negligence per se the statute merely
establishes the standard of care where a common law duty was already in
existence. In contrast, according to the implied rights doctrine, the statute
may establish an entirely new cause of action where none existed at common law. Implied rights cases are derived from situations where the duty
and, hence, the very cause of action were created by statute. Even though
there existed no liability for violation of the statute at common law, no matter how unreasonable the conduct.
The distinction between negligence per se and implied causes of action
provides a theoretical basis from which the position of Justice Powell can
be surmounted. Justice Powell believes Rigsby can be read as a negligence
per se case and therefore the statutory tort principle and the line of cases
which follow it are unconstitutional since the law of negligence, in terms of
federal general common law, is non-existent. Not only is Justice Powell ignoring the fact that Rigsby relied upon the English implication case, Couch
v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (P.B. 1854), but he also is ignoring the fact that
the Court had used Rigsby to support the statutory tort principle in cases
where negligence per se was clearly not involved. Hence, Justice Powell's
argument has been rendered an academic exercise of dubious logic.
13. See generally Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L.
REV.317 (1914).
14. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
15. Id. at 163.
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The Elements of the Statutory Tort Principle
The framework of analysis drawn from these early decisions
became known as the statutory tort principle. Not every violation of a statute gives rise to a cause of action under this theory.
The law will imply a civil remedy, in the absence of an express
provision, only if:
1. there has been a violation of a provision that was intended to benefit a particular class of persons;
2. the plaintiff was a member of the class to whom the legislatively created duty was owed; 16 and
3. the plaintiff's interest that was intended to be protected
by the provision has been invaded by the conduct constituting
17
the violation.
16. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court granted an implied cause
of action to the largest class possible-all individuals in the United States.
The plaintiff sued federal narcotics agents for their alleged unconstitutional
conduct, arguing that by entering and searching his apartment without a
warrant or probable cause, the agents violated his rights under the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution. Allowing the private cause
of action to be implied from the fourth amendment, the Court held that the
fourth amendment's guarantee that all citizens shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is a federal right that federal courts should protect. Id. at 393. Although Bivens did not involve a statutory violation, its
expansive view of an especial class has been cited with approval by the
Supreme Court in a statutory implied cause of action case, Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975). The plaintiff need not be an individual since a cause of
action has been implied in favor of the United States in Wyandotte Transp.
Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
In more recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has restricted the
especial class. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). Lower courts have
also avoided applying the statutory tort principle by strictly limiting the
class of intended beneficiaries. See, e.g., Vanderbroom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d
1233, 1243 (8th Cir. 1970); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 790
(8th Cir. 1967); 27 Puerto Rican Migrant Farm Workers v. Shade Tobacco,
352 F. Supp. 986, 993 (D. Conn. 1973).
17. The rationale that the harm which provides the basis for the implied
cause of action must be the kind that the statute was intended to prevent
had its beginnings in the famous English case, Gorris v. Scott, 9 L.R. 125
(Exch. 1874). Gorris provided a framework for analysis directed at determining what relationships the legislature intended to affect. It has been
suggested the reason American courts unquestioningly followed the decision in Gorris is that:
unlike their predecessors which formed an essential part of the monarch's machinery for providing justice in competition with an increasingly active parliament, courts of 19th Century England and American
courts from the beginning were viewed as passive arbiters of private
conflict and not as policy-making arms of government.
J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAw SysTEM 959 (1975). See also 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 17.6, at 99798, 1003 (1956); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 35 (4th ed. 1971). Thus, by determining
what relationships the legislature intended to affect, a court determines
who are the members of the especial class which, in turn, determines the
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Both state and federal courts were slow to adopt the statutory tort principle enunciated in Rigsby, and it was not until the
1940's that the doctrine began to achieve wide application in the
United States. 18 But, the question still remained as to what
weight should be given to express remedial provisions of a statute as evidence that the legislature intended that these express
provisions be the exclusive remedy.
The Role of Statutory Construction
The weight a court should give to the existence of express
remedies as evidence of Congressional intent against implied
causes of action was addressed in Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co. 19 In Kardon, the complaint alleged that due to misrepresentations and suppressions of truth on the part of the defendant, the plaintiffs were induced to sell their stock for far less
than its true value. The defendants moved to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
against them. They also asserted that the court did not have jurisdiction over them since, without a cause of action, the jurisdictional provision of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193420
appropriateness of implication of a private cause of action. Therefore, essential in the Constitutional scheme of separation of powers is the necessity for a court to begin its analysis by addressing itself to identifying the
members of the class for whose especial benefit or protection the statute
was enacted.
18. See, e.g., Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944); Kardon v. National Gypsum,
69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
State courts have been somewhat slower to adopt the statutory tort
principle. See, e.g., Wolf v. Smith, 149 Ala. 457, 42 So. 824 (1906) (personal
injury); Sapiro v. Frisbie, 93 Cal. App. 299, 270 P. 280 (1928) (zoning violation); H. Christiansen and Sons, Inc. v. City of Duluth, 225 Minn. 475, 31
N.W.2d 270 (1948) (obstruction of a waterway); Abounader v. Strohmeyer &
Arpe Co., 243 N.Y. 458, 154 N.E. 309 (1926) (food labeling).
The principle was also adopted by the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286
(1934) which states the violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an
invasion of an interest of another if:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an
interest of the other as an individual; and
(b)
the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to
protect; and
(c)
where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular hazard, the invasion of the interests results from that hazard;
and
(d) the violation is the legal cause of the invasion, and the other has
not so conducted himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action.
See also W. PROSSER, TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
19. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
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did not apply. The parties agreed that the defendants had violated section 10(b) 2 1 and rule 10b-5. 22 At issue, however, was the
propriety of implying a civil cause of action for damages on behalf of a single investor who was injured by the violation of the
Act.
The district court held that an implied cause of action existed for violations of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The court followed Rigsby, which had declared that disregard of the
command of a statute is a tort, and commented that this rule
was "more than a canon of statutory construction. '23 This allowed the court to reject the defendant's argument which was
based on the application of the rule expressio unius est exclusio
24
alterius-expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.
The defendants in Kardon argued that the 1934 Act contained three sections which prohibited certain types of conduct
and expressly provided for a civil action by an aggrieved party,
whereas section 10(b) did not.25 Applying the expressio maxim,
defendants argued that Congressional intent to withhold a civil
action could be deduced by their failure to provide for one. In
response, the court stated:
The argument is not without force. Were the whole question one of
statutory interpretation it might be convincing, but the question is
only partly such. It is whether an intention can be implied to deny
a remedy and to wipe out a liability which, normally, by virtue of
basic principles of tort law accompanies the doing of a prohibited
act . . . .In other words, in view of the general purpose of the act,
the mere omission of an express provision 26for civil liability is not
sufficient to negative what the law implies.
Kardon made it clear that an implied cause of action was
perceived as fundamental and deeply ingrained in the securities
law. Therefore an implied action existed unless the legislation
clearly evidenced a contrary intention. By itself, the expressio
maxim could not be used to supply sufficient contrary legislative
intent to deny a private cause of action. The mere fact that a
criminal statute imposed criminal sanctions was not sufficient to
negate the presumption in favor of allowing a civil action if the
27
statute was enacted for a specified class.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10B (1980).
23. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
24. Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 692 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See also Botany Mills v. United States,
278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929) (expressio maxim means that when a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of
any other mode).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970); and 15 U.S.C.

§ 78r(a) (1970). All explicitly provide for private causes of action.
26. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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Despite the fact that the statutory tort principle had gained
general acceptance in the federal courts, its applicability to
claims under specific statutory contexts remained contingent
upon the shifting judicial attitude of the Supreme Court. In a
series of decisions in the 1950's, the Court refused to imply a
28
cause of action upon the finding of adverse legislative intent.
The strong dissents in these cases accented the disagreement as
to what factors are dispositive in determining the propriety of
implying a cause of action. 29 What became clear under these de27. Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947). Judge
Learned Hand stated:
Although the Communications Act of 1934 does not expressly create
any civil liability, we can see no reason why the situation is not within
the doctrine which, in the absence of contrary implications, construes a
criminal statute, enacted for the protection of a specified class, as creating a civil right in members of that class, although the only express
sanctions are criminal.
Id. at 694.
28. T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959); Nashville Milk Co.
v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958); Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
These cases indicate that the Court was attempting to develop a clear
legislative intent test to determine when implication of a private action was
appropriate. Yet, logic dictates that seldom does legislative history contain
any clear expressions vis-a-vis implication of private damage action. If Congress had considered the question it would have provided express remedies. Hence, the Court was really only marshalling supportive rationale to
justify the result. The question can be proffered:
[w] hether there is such a thing as a discoverable legislative intent ...
The controversy has centered principally over the relevance and competence of legislative history materials in ascertaining legislative intent
as well as the weight which should be accorded them. The Supreme
Court not infrequently divides as to what is shown by or may be implied from legislative history.
Comment, The Phenomenon of Implied PrivateActions Under Federal Statutes: JudicialInsight, Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the Judiciary,
43 FORDHAM L. REV. 441, 443-44 (1974).
29. All three cases were decided by a five to four margin. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Nashville Milk, maintained the Court ought to imply a
cause of action because the legislative history could be read so as to permit
implication. 355 U.S. at 383. Foreshadowing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426 (1964), Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Montana-Dakota Util., argued
that a private action ought to be allowed if it was "appropriate to effectuate
the purposes of a statute." Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub.
Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 261 (1951). If this criterion was satisfied, Justice
Frankfurter urged that the Court should deny implication only if such actions would interfere unduly with an administrative agency's exercise of its
expertise or if it would impose burdens upon the courts which they were
not equipped to handle. Id. at 263.
In T.I.M.E., Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the
existence of a savings clause, a provision which preserves pre-existing common law remedies, should be viewed as dispositive evidence of legislative
intent to allow implied damage actions. T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359
U.S. 464, 480 (1979). Such an approach is questionable because a savings
clause, as its name suggests, does not purport to create new remedies. Only
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cisions was that the statutory tort principle, alone, did not provide a satisfactory test. Greater deference to legislative intent
and purpose was necessary.
Implied Causes of Action as a Means to
Effectuate Legislative Purpose
In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,30 the Supreme Court looked to the
broad remedial purposes of the federal securities laws to develop a new criterion for implying a cause action. The, plaintiff in Borak was a shareholder of the Case Company. He
alleged that the defendants had circulated false and misleading
32
31
proxy solicitations in violation of section 14(a) and rule 14a-9
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. He further alleged
that the merger of Case with another corporation had been effected through the use of these unsolicited proxies. Plaintiff
sought both a declaratory judgment holding the merger void,
and damages for himself and all others similarly situated. Section 14(a) was silent as to a cause of action. Thus, if the plaintiff
was to have relief, the Court would again be faced with fashioning sound criteria for implying a remedy.
In a unanimous decision, the Court held a private cause of
action could be maintained by alleging a section 14(a) violation.
The Court based its decision on section 27 of the Act which provided for exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts over "all suits
in equity or actions at law brought to enforce any liability or
duty created under the Act or the rules thereunder. '33 The
Court relied upon this broad grant of jurisdiction to conclude
that private parties are authorized under section 27 to bring implied damage actions for violations of section 14(a). 3 4 Such rationale seemed to preempt the basic inquiry under the statutory
tort principle of whether section 14(a) created a duty in the defendant to the class of which the plaintiff was a member. The
Court looked to the jurisdictional provisions rather than the
two conclusions can logically be drawn from the existence of a savings
clause: first, the clause applies only to pre-existing remedies and not implied causes of actions grounded in rights created by federal statute which
were not legally recognized at common law, and, second, it applies only to
those remedies which are not inconsistent with the act. For a discussion on
Justice Black's dissent in TI.M.E., see Comment, Private Rights of Action
Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implicationsfor Implication, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1392, 1420-22 (1975).
30. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1980).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
34. 377 U.S. at 430-31.
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substantive section 14(a) as a source of a plaintiff's right to
maintain a cause of action under the Act.
Despite the fact that the Court ignored the duty-creating
language of section 14(a), the holding was based on more than
just the jurisdictional provision. The Court maintained that although section 14(a) did not contain an express cause of action,
"among its chief purposes was the protection of investors, which
certainly implied the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result. '3 5 The Court noted that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as amicus curiae, had
advised the Court that it was overburdened with proxy solicitations, making thorough examinations impracticable. 36 Under
these circumstances, the Court concluded that it was "the duty
as are necesof the Courts to be alert to provide such remedies
'37
sary to effectuate the congressional purpose.
At this point in the development of the application of implication, the rationale of Rigsby and Borak gave the Courts sufficient precedent to imply a cause of action in the proper factual
situation. Rigsby enunciated the statutory tort principle-the
plaintiff must be a member of the class of persons the statute
was designed to protect. Borak held that it was proper for
courts to scrutinize the express remedies provided in the statute, and upon a determination that they were inadequate to fulfill the statutory purpose, to imply a private cause of action to
effectuate the legislative purpose. 38 Ten years after Borak, the
Court, with several new justices, re-examined the issue and applied a restrictive approach to the implication of private reme9
dies.3
35. Id. at 432.
36. Id. The SEC advised the Court that it examined over 2,000 proxy
statements annually and that time did not permit an independent examination of facts set out in the proxy material. This resulted in the acceptance of
the representations contained in the statements at their face value. Since
the injury which a stockholder suffers from corporate action pursuant to a
deceptive proxy statement ordinarily flows from the damage done to the
corporation and not from damage done directly to the stockholder, the
Court felt that implied derivative actions were within the sweep of § 27, the
acts jurisdictional provision. See generally Comment, Private Rights and
Federal Remedies: Herein of JI. Case v. Borak, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1150
(1965); Note, Violation of Proxy Rules: Private Right of Action: Retrospective Relief: JI. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), 50 CORNELL L.Q. 370
(1965).
37. 377 U.S. at 433.
38. Id. See Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash:
Some Implicationsfor Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392, 1396 (1975).
39. This restrictive approach was drawn from the philosophy of judicial
restraint and reluctance to broaden the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary
prevalent on the Burger Court. This view stands in sharp contrast to the
liberal philosophy of the Warren Court under whose tenure Borak was de-
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The Amtrak Test
The issue in National RailroadPassenger Corp. v. National
Association of RailroadPassengers (Amtrak) 40 was whether a
cause of action could be implied in favor of railroad passengers
41
under the Rail Service Passenger Act of 1970 (Amtrak Act).
That statute created Amtrak as a private not-for-profit corporation to develop a modern rail passenger system. 42 The corporation was permitted to abandon uneconomic routes in accordance
with statutorily prescribed procedures and without the approval
of the Interstate Commerce Commission or state regulatory
agencies. 43 In Amtrak, an association of railroad passengers
sought to enjoin the discontinuance of certain passenger routes
and contended that Amtrak had acted in disregard of the procedures specified in the Act. The Supreme Court viewed the
threshold question as whether the Amtrak Act created a cause
of action whereby a private party could enforce the duties and
obligations imposed by the Act. 44
Amtrak argued section 307(a), which granted jurisdiction to
the district courts to enjoin any violation of the statute "upon
petition of the Attorney General of the United States or in the
case of a labor agreement, upon petition of any employee affected thereby, ' 45 shielded it from judicial review at the behest
of passengers. Their position was that the section should be
read as evidencing a clear congressional intent to bar anyone,
except the Attorney General or an employee, from bringing suit
under the.Act. Inasmuch as the passengers were not designated
parties under section 307(a), they could not bring an action in
federal district court. Essentially, the argument was grounded
upon the expressio maxim of statutory construction-expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.46 Under the statutory tort principle, this maxim was generally deemed
unpersuasive in that the mere omission of an express provision
cided. See McMahon &Rodos, JudicialImplicationof Private Causes of Action: Reappraisaland Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REV. 167 (1976).
40. 441 U.S. 453 (1974).
41. 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-644 (1970).
42. Id. at § 501.
43. Id. at § 564.
44. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 456 (1974).
45. 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1970).
46. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See also Botany

Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929); Saslaw v. Weiss, 133 Ohio St.
496, 14 N.E. 2d 930, 932 (1938); Fazio v. Pittsburg Rys. Co., 321 Pa. 7, 182 A. 696,
698 (1936) (mention of one thing implies exclusion of another); Little v.
Town of Conway, 170 S.C. 27, 171 S.E. 447, 448 (1933) (when certain persons
or things are specified in a law an intention to exclude all other from its
operation may be inferred).
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for civil liability was deemed insufficient to surmount a presumption arising out of a legislatively created duty. The Court
felt it was proper to search for legislative intent to create or
deny an implied cause of action. Since expressio was a means
of ascertaining legislative intent from the face of a statute, the
maxim's vitality in cases involving implied causes of action was
renewed.
The Court, however, did not base its holding solely on the
expressio maxim. The majority also found legislative intent to
deny a private cause of action from the fact that Congress had
failed to adopt a proposed amendment which would have expressly provided redress for any aggrieved party under the statute.47 This factor, combined with a narrow reading of the Act,
led the Court to conclude that allowing passengers a cause of
action would force Amtrak to maintain uneconomic routes during the pendency of48litigation which would delay the modernization of rail service.
The Court's reasoning in Amtrak ignored its previous decision in Allen v. State Board of Elections.49 The question
presented in that case was whether a cause of action could be
inferred under the Voting Rights Act of 1965.50 The Court allowed a private right of action and held that achievement of the
statute's purpose would be "severely hampered" without such
remedies. 51 In Allen, the Court noted that the designation of the
Attorney General of the United States as the enforcing agent
was not to be viewed as evidence of legislative intent to exclude
private actions. 52 In Amtrak the legislative designation of an enforcing authority was deemed to be persuasive evidence of legislative intent to deny an implied right of action; hence, this made
Amtrak and Allen irreconcilable.
The Court's rationale in Amtrak indicates a presumption
against implication exists when a remedy is expressly provided
by Congress. It follows that this presumption could only be rebutted by a finding of some affirmative Congressional intent to
47. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 459-63 (1974).
48. Id. at 463. Here, the Court's reasoning could be challenged as being
unsound. The Court's analysis of the statutory purpose gave undue emphasis to the discontinuance problem and neglected the concept that one of the
other central goals of the Act was to minimize the abandonment of passen-

ger service in the Northeast. Clearly, implication would aid the achievement of this goal by providing a check on the unrestrained discretion of
Amtrak in the paring of uneconomic train routes.
49. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb (1970).
51. 393 U.S. at 556.
52. Id.
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provide a remedy. This view stands in direct opposition to the
statutory tort principle that where a federal right is created by a
statute, a federal remedy must be fashioned by the courts to
protect that right.
The Cort Test
In Cort v. Ash, 53 the Supreme Court considered whether a
derivative action for damages could be implied from criminal
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act 54 prohibiting
corporate expenditures in federal elections. Cort arose out of a
political advertisement paid for by the Bethlehem Steel Corporation. Ash, a stockholder, individually and derivatively sought
an injunction and damages by alleging that the corporation had
violated section 610 of the Federal Election Act. 55 The district
judge granted summary judgment for the defendants on the initial ground that the plaintiff did not have a private right of action
under the statute. 56 On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Ap- .
peals reversed, holding that unless Congress clearly indicated
an intent to deny a cause of action, the possible effectuation of
the legislative policies underlying the statute was sufficient reason to imply a cause of action. 57 The Supreme Court unani58
mously reversed the decision.
In reaching its decision, the Court redefined the standard
for resolving an implication question. Justice Brennan identified four factors which were relevant in the determination of
"whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly
providing for one. '5 9 The first three factors were drawn from the
previous implication cases. Rigsby was cited for the first factor,
the statutory tort principle-that "the plaintiff must be in the
53. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
54. 18 U.S.C. §§ 591-607 (1970), as amended (Supp. IV 1974).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (repealed 1976).
56. Ash v. Cort, 350 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
57. Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974). In his dissent, Judge Aldisert
stated that the statutory tort principle would open the door of federal courts
to a mul tiplicity of such actions "within the framework of every federal

criminal statute" in favor of any plaintiff who could show protected status.
496 F.2d at 428 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
58. The Court also denied the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff
due to an intervening amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act.
The 1974 amendment created a Federal Election Commission with jurisdiction to receive and investigate complaints and with the discretion to refer
such complaints to the Attorney General who may seek injunctive relief. In
light of this amendment, the Court held that private parties must exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 75-76 (1975).

59. 422 U.S. at 78.
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60
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.
Borak was also cited in support of this factor. This indicates
that an inquiry into what group could best effectuate legislative
purpose would be an appropriate means to determine membership in the especial class. Amtrak provided the second factor,
posing the question of "whether there is any discernible legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or
to deny one."' 61 The third factor, also drawn from Amtrak, was
whether an implied action was consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme. 62 The fourth factor of the
Cort test proffered a new question; whether the cause of action
is one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically of
to infer a
concern to the States, so that it would be inappropriate
63
cause of action based solely on federal law.

60. Id., quoting Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
See generally Seng, Private Rights of Action, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 1117 (1978).
Professor Seng's belief that the four elements are listed in descending order
of importance appears to have a basis in that if the plaintiff is deemed to be
a member of the especial class, then a rebuttable presumption in favor of an
implied cause of action arises simultaneously.
61. 422 U.S. at 78. Some commentators have suggested that this might
be the single principle for which Amtrak stood. E.g., Comment, Private
Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implicationsfor Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392, 1401-04 (1975). Certainly this prong of the Cort
test adopted the "clear legislative intent test," developed by lower courts to
resolve implication cases. In Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890
(10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972), the test was stated as follows:
This court will not fashion civil remedies from federal regulatory statutes except where . . .the intent of Congress to create private rights

can be found in the statute or in its legislative history. Had the Congress intended to create private causes of action and private remedies,
it was fully capable of directly and clearly so providing.
456 F.2d at 894-95. The clear legislative intent test ensured that implication
would be employed sparingly. As one court stated, "judicial implication of
ancillary Federal remedies is a matter to be treated with care, lest a carefully erected legislative scheme-often the result of a delicate balance of
Federal and state, public and private interests-be skewed by the courts,
albeit inadvertently." Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989
(D.C. Cir. 1973). Congress, by vesting an administrative agency with discretion in enforcing the act's penalty provisions, realized that a court could not
be expected to use its discretion in the same manner that an agency would.
Accordingly, the court's role with respect to some regulatory statutes
should be limited to judicial review of agency action.
62. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). The Court's consideration of this
factor seems to indicate that all that is necessary is a generalized search for
Congress' attitude towards implied causes of action as manifested in the
statutory framework.
63. Id. at 85. This concept of the protected enclave of state law has been
offered as a general restriction on the reach of the common law power of the
federal courts. For a discussion of limiting the range of federal common and

federal legislative power see NLRB v. Jones &Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.

1, 97 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting). See also Note, Implying Civil
Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes 77 HARv. L. REV. 285, 287-88
(1963).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 14:141

Application of the Cort Test
In applying the first three factors to the factual situation in
Cort, the Court departed from its analysis in prior cases. The
'especial benefit' language of Rigsby was used to distinguish between the primary and secondary beneficiaries of the statute in
question. A stockholder was viewed to be the secondary beneficiary since the statute was aimed at curbing the undue influence
which the aggregated wealth of corporations might have on the
outcome of federal elections. Additionally, the Court found that
another purpose of section 610 was to discourage the use of corporate funds without the consent of the stockholders. 64 The
Court ranked the stockholders interest as secondary to that of
the corporation's, which was viewed as primary. It held that a
primary beneficiary, the corporation, could take advantage of
the presumption in favor of implied causes of action, whereas a
secondary beneficiary's, the stockholders, assertion of an implied right was dependent upon showing congressional intent to
65
create a cause of action.
This arbitrary refusal to view more than one class as a 'primary' beneficiary seemed at odds with Rigsby where the 'especial benefit' rubric was first coined. In Rigsby, the statute at
issue protected both employees and passengers. Presumably,
both groups were primary beneficiaries. The ranking of groups
in Cort also seemed irreconcilable with Borak where stockholders were permitted to bring both direct and derivative suits.
Therefore, Cort must have modified, sub silentio, the holding in
Borak, making that decision binding precedent only for the
66
facts of that case.
64. 422 U.S. at 80.
65. Id. at 81. For discussiQns of Cort and the distinctions between primary and secondary beneficiaries see Note, Federal Courts-Implied Private Action Not Available under 18 U.S.C. § 610 When It Would Intrude on
Area Traditionally Committed to State Law Without Aiding the Main Purpose of the Act Court v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66(1975), 25 CATH. L. REV. 447 (1976);
Note, FederalJurisdiction-ImpliedCauses of Action-No Private Remedy
Available under Federal Election Campaign Act, 47 Miss. L.J. 156 (1976);
Note, Remedies-Private Right of Action Not to be Implied from Federal
Corrupt PracticesAct, 50 TUL. L. REV. 713 (1976).
66. It may be true that a wish to free federal elections from the improper influence of aggregated corporate wealth was foremost in the mind
of Congress when it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (repealed 1976). Yet, this
does not alter the fact that the legislative history does disclose a corollary
concern for the stockholder's interest in not having to subsidize those contributions. 422 U.S. at 80. By itself, that fact should have been enough to
give the plaintiffs, at least presumptively, especial beneficiary status. The
primary reason that the plaintiffs should be allowed this status is that "secondary beneficiaries" are usually in the best position to prosecute violations of the statute. Borak recognized that an injury to the individual
stockholder invariably flows from an injury to the corporation; therefore, to
hold that derivative action, which must necessarily be brought by "secon-
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The Court, having found that the statute in question created
no rights in a specific class so as to give rise to a presumption in
favor of implication, went on to apply the next two factors.
These factors, involving a search for legislative intent and purpose, generally, would not by themselves provide a basis for implication. Once a court has concluded that a plaintiff must show
clear legislative intent, the inquiry virtually ends because had
Congress considered attaching a remedy to a particular provision, it would have expressly done so. Therefore, a plaintiff arguing that legislative intent and purpose supported his position,
had a dubious position at best.
Along with the three factors garnered from previous cases,
the Court added an additional inquiry: whether the cause of action was one traditionally relegated to states so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law. The Court determined, in the process of isolating the intended beneficiaries from the statute, that it was only the secondary purpose of the Act to discourage use of corporate funds
without stockholder consent. Therefore, the Court found that
Congress had no intent to preempt state regulation of corporations. Since the use of corporate funds in violation of federal
law or for political purposes may be ultra vires, or a breach of
fiduciary duty, or a violation of state election campaign laws, a
6 7
federal remedy would be both unnecessary and inappropriate.
Cort purported to merge the statutory tort principle, the
Borak focus on legislative purpose, and the Amtrak clear legislative intent approach.6 8 The Court intended, however, that the
Cort factors be used somewhat restrictively. Such an intention
is derived from the Court's application of the test to the facts in
Cort. By drawing a distinction between primary and secondary
beneficiaries, the Court made it clear that causes of action were
not to be implied merely to fill a hiatus in the legislative enforcement scheme. 69 Nonetheless, lower courts have applied the
dary" beneficiaries, are not to be implied would be tantamount to a complete denial of private relief. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
Despite the fact a different statutory scheme was involved in Cort, the distinction between primary and secondary beneficiaries would always bar implied derivative causes of action. Therefore, by its rationale, Cort must
partially overrule Borak. For a discussion of this aspect of Borak, see Note,
SEC Proxy Regulation: Private Enforcement and Federal Remedies, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 1336 (1964).
67. 422 U.S. at 84.
68. See generally Petersen, Implied Remedies Under Federal Statutes.
A New Look, 80 COM. L.J. 480 (1975).
69. In Cort, the Court refused to deal with the convergencelof two interests, the primary interests of the voting citizen in fair elections i and the secondary interest of a stockholder in his investment, in the same plaintiff.
Those two interests, considered complementary in the context of a different
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Cort test both narrowly and broadly, seeming to use it only as
70
justification for their result.
A Narrow Interpretation
The Supreme Court's move towards a policy of judicial restraint and its reluctance to broaden the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary has been re-emphasized by its continued narrow
interpretation of the first factor of the Cort test. For example, in
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,7 1 the Court held that a
plaintiff suing in the dual capacity of a tender-offeror and a
shareholder could not maintain an implied cause of action under
a statute which, on its face, created a duty only in favor of nontender-offeror shareholders.7 2 The Court reasoned that statustatutory scheme in Borak, should not be the basis of a distinction as to
what plaintiff may assert an implied private cause of action. A secondary
beneficiary's cause of action, even in the context of the statute involved in
Cort, would directly promote the primary purpose of the legislative scheme.
If, however, there was a statutory scheme in which the interests of the primary and secondary beneficiaries are repugnant, the second and third factors of the Cort test would urge denial of a private right of action. See
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 424 (1975).
70. Some courts that have applied Cort are: City of Rohnert Park v.
Harris, 601 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1979) (Housing Act of 1949); Caceres Agency
Inc. v. Trans World Airways Inc., 594 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1979) (Fed. Aviation
Act of 1958); Bratton v. Shiffrin, 585 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978) (Fed. Aviation
Act of 1958); International Union U.A.W. v. National Right to Work Legal
Defense and Educ. Found. Inc., 590 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959); Vazquez v. Eastern Airlines
Inc., 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978) (Age Discrimination in Emp. Act of 1967);
Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1978) (Inv. Advisors Act of 1940); McDaniel v. University of Chicago, 548 F.2d 689 (7th Cir.
1977) (Davis-Bacon Act of 1931); United Handicapped Fed'n. v. Andre, 558
F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977) (Rehabilitiation Act of 1973); Utah State Univ. of
Agriculture and Applied Science v. Bear, Stearns, and Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th
Cir. 1977) (Regulation T of Sec. Exch. Act of 1934); Adams v. Federal Express Corp., 547 F.2d 319 (6th Cir. 1976) (Railway Labor Act of 1926); Kelly v.
E.E.O.C., 468 F. Supp. 417 (D. Md. 1979) (no implied right of action against
E.E.O.C. for negligent performance of duties); Drake v. Detroit Edison Co.,
443 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (Atomic Energy Act of 1954); Hall v.
E.E.O.C., 456 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (Title VII); Wolfson v. Baker, 444
F. Supp. 1124 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (NYSE Rule 405); Abernathy v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. N.C. 1976) (Federal Alcohol Administration
Act of 1935); Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (Federal Aviation Act of 1958).
71. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
72. In Piper,suit was brought by Chris-Craft, the unsuccessful offerer in
a takeover contest for control of Piper Aircraft. Chris-Craft alleged that the
management of Piper, its investment advisor, and the successful offeror,
Bangor Punta Corp., had violated § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. This section makes unlawful any "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices in connection with any tender offer ... or any solicita"
tion of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer ..
The issue presented was whether a party in the dual capacity of tenderofferor and shareholder could maintain a private cause of action for damages under § 14(e) for injury suffered as a result of fraudulent practices.
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tory regulation of the especial class, in effect, deprives those
same plaintiffs who are members of that especial class of the
benefit of the presumption arising under a statutory tort principle. Justice Stevens's dissent, pointed out that such a restrictive
reading of the first factor in Cort was absurd. 73 He noted that
Congress had passed the statutory provision at issue to expand
the especial class; therefore, a narrow interpretation of the first
Cort factor deprived those who could only effectuate the purpose of the statute from their right of action. 74 Thus, the majority seemed to be thwarting legislative intent by confining the
application of the Cort test to the face of the statute, 75 a policy
Although the issue in the case was framed in the form of whether § 14(e)
implies a private cause of action, the Court decided the cause on the basis
of standing to sue.
In writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger applied Cort as a
standing test, identifying the especial class Congress intended to benefit.
The majority found that § 14(e) was enacted for the benefit of shareholders
because it set standards for fair competition during the pendency of a
tender offer. Chris-Craft was denied relief. The majority reasoned that
only shareholders had standing under § 14(e), and since Chris-Craft had
brought this action in its dual capacity of a shareholder, and a tender-offeror, it was not a member of the narrow especial class.
73. 430 U.S. at 55.
74. Justice Stevens argued that tender-offerors have sufficient stake in
the controversy to satisfy the doctrine of standing. 430 U.S. at 62.
In Borak, a unanimous Court held that the 1934 Act i'mplicitly authorized a shareholder to bring an action for recission or damages for violation
of § 14(a). Such a remedy was regarded as essential, because the SEC is
overwhelmed with its workload. 377 U.S. at 432-33.
Harvey Pitt, General Counsel for the SEC, has commented that the
Court's refusal to allow private enforcement actions "could impose a significant manpower burden" on the SEC. Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 1977, at 4, col. 1.
This encouragement of private enforcement was also reflected in the SEC's
Brief as Amicus Curiae at 12.
75. 430 U.S. at 38-39. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979), the Court finally expressly limited the first Cort factor to the face of
the statute. The plaintiff, a female, brought suit against two private universities, alleging sex discrimination in violation of § 901(a) of Title IX of the
Education Admendments of 1972. Since the statute does not expressly authorize a private right of action, the plaintiff brought it under a doctrine of
implication. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, using the Amtrak and
Cort standards, ruled there was no implied cause of action, since § 902 of
Title IX provided a remedy. The court concluded that Congress intended
§ 902 to be the exclusive means of enforcement.
In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court declared that the
fact a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed, does not
automatically give rise to a private cause of action, Congress must have intended to make a remedy available. Applying the Cort test to determine
the Congressional intent to supply a remedy, the Court concluded that the
plaintiff had a statutory right to pursue her claim.
The Court determined that the threshold question was whether the
plaintiff was a member of the "especial class." In their analysis, the Court
added a new criterion to the first prong of the test by limiting the search for
the "especial class" to the face of the statute. This direction implicitly re-
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that would eventually eliminate the theoretical basis for implied
76
causes of action-the statutory tort principle.
IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION:

A

LEGAL THEORY WHOSE TIME HAS PASSED

In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington'77 the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (SIPC) and a judicially appointed
trustee sought to recover money damages from an accounting
firm. The brokerage house had misrepresented its assets during
the years 1969 to 1973. During those years, Touche Ross had
been retained to audit the books of the brokerage house. The
audit was required under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. Section 17(a) requires that an annual report of the
financial condition of registered brokerage firms be filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Its purpose is
to provide the SEC with an early warning mechanism so that
remedial action could be taken to forstall insolvency and lessen
adverse financial consequences of investors of a brokerage
78
firm.
The SIPC, pursuant to its statutory authority, had paid the
brokerage firm's customers fourteen million dollars when the
jects looking beyond the statute to the legislative purpose to determine the
enactment's beneficiaries.
In analyzing the statute, the Court found that Congress had unmistakably focused on the benefited class in that the phrase, "no person shall," had
previously been held to create new rights. The Court noted that right-duty
creating language was the most accurate indictor of the propriety of implying a cause of action. The Court concluded that since the plaintiff was
clearly a member of the benefited class, the first part of the Cort test was
satisfied.
76. In Cannon, the majority attempted to reaffirm the statutory tort
principle despite the Court's limiting the search for the "especial class" to
the face of the statute. In a footnote, the Court stated:
Not surprisingly, the right- or duty- creating language of the statute
has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action. With the exception of one case, in which the
relevant statute reflected a special policy against judicial interference,
this Court has never refused to imply a cause of action where the language of the statute explicitly conferred a right directly on a class of
persons that included the plaintiff in the case.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-91 n.13 (1979).
Despite this apparent reaffirmation that the first Cort factor embodied
the statutory tort principle, Cannon was cited by Justice Rehnquist in
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) as authority for eliminating any reliance on tort principle from the law of implication. Justice
Rehnquist stated, "[tihe fact that a federal statute has been violated and
some person harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of
action in favor of that person. Instead our task is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the private right of action .
442 U.S. at 468 (citations omitted).
77. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1976).
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firm's insolvency was discovered and its assets had been liquidated. The SIPC sought to recover that amount from Touche
Ross. The trustee, Redington, sought to recover an additional
fifty-one million dollars in uncompensated losses suffered by
customers of the defunct brokerage house. Plaintiffs contended
that section 17(a) created a duty flowing from the accounting
firm that prepared the annual report to the customers of the
brokerage firm. That duty involved preparing a thorough and
accurate statement so as to provide the SEC with a means to
monitor the financial conditions of brokerage firms. The SIPC
and the trustee alleged that Touche Ross had breached this duty
and therefore a cause of action, predicated upon a violation of
section 17(a), should be implied. 79 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals applying the Cort test found that a violation of section
17(a) gave rise to a cause of action.80 The Supreme Court re81
versed.
Limiting the Inquiry to the Face of the Statute
Speaking for the Court, Justice Rehnquist began the opinion by stating that the "question of the existence of a statutory
'82
cause of action is, of course, one of statutory construction.
83
The inquiry is limited to the face of the statute. Going beyond
any previous decision, Justice Rehnquist proclaimed that tort
principles could never justify the implication of a damage rem84
edy.
Applying these new rules to the facts in Touche Ross, the
Court noted that section 17(a) was positioned in the statutory
79. Specifically, the SIPC sought to recover either as subrogee of Weis's
customers whose claims it had paid under the Act or as a member of the
group directly injured by Touche Ross's mistakes. The trustee asserted

that he should recover either by standing in the shoes of Weis's customers,
since under the Act his responsibility is to marshal and return their property, or by standing in the shoes of Weis itself, since, he alleged, Weis-as
an entity distinct from its conniving officers-was directly damaged by
Touche Ross's careless audit.
80. Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1978).
81. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 562 (1979). Justice
Rehnquist opened the opinion by noting with seeming disdain that in this

term alone the Court had been called on five times to decide whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing for one.

82. 442 U.S. at 568.
83. Id.
84. Id. This follows from reducing the inquiry to one of statutory construction as to whether Congress intended to create a cause of action. In
taking this drastic step which, in effect, closes the door on new implied

causes of action, the Court seemed to be responding to Justice Powell's dis-

sent in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Arguing that
the Cort test too readily permits implying a civil damge action, Justice Powell stated, "[Tihis Court consistently has turned back attempts to create
private actions ....
[Olther federal courts have tended to proceed in exactly the opposite direction. In the four years since we decided Cort, no
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scheme so as to implicitly indicate that Congress intended there
to be no implied action against accountants. The Court pointed
out that since sections 9(e), 16(b), and 18(a) all expressly provide for an action, Congress knew how to provide an express
remedy when it wished. 85 Since Congress failed to provide a
remedy in section 17(a), the Court reasoned that Congress had
considered and rejected the provision of a remedy. Such statutory construction was merely an application of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius-expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another.
Under the statutory tort principle approach, the expressio
maxim was treated as evidence against implication, but not as
conclusive. 86 By defining the issue of whether a cause of action
should be implied solely as a question of statutory construction,
maxims of statutory construction become dispositive. This approach undermines prior implication cases and undercuts the
utility of the Cort test which went beyond the face of the statute
87
to determine the necessity for an implied cause of action.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan refused to join in
the statutory construction rationale of Justice Rehnquist. Instead, by applying the first prong of the Cort test to the facts, he
concluded that section 17(a) did not create any federal rights in
either the SIPC or the trustee. 88 Considering the second Cort
factor, Justice Brennan found no indication of either explicit or
implicit legislative intent to create an implied remedy. 89 Thereless than 20 decisions by the courts of appeals have implied private actions
from federal statutes." 441 U.S. at 741-42.
85. This seems to be an application of the expressio maxim. These sec-

tions were deemed not to be a bar to implying a cause of action under either
§ 10(b) or Rule lOb-5. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).

In every recent decision where the Court has denied an implied private
cause of action, it has invoked the expressio maxim. In relying on the
maxim in Touche Ross, the Court has ignored cases that have criticized its
application. See, e.g., SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943)

where the Court stated that rules of statutory construction such as the expressio maxim:

come down to us from sources that were hostile toward the legislative
process itself and thought it generally wise to restrict the operation of
an act to its narrowest permissible compass. However well these rules
may serve at times to aid in deciphering legislative intent, they long
have been subordinated to the doctine that courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose ....
Id. at 350. See also HART & SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (temp. ed. 1958)
(rejected the usefulness of the expressio maxim).
86. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
87. See generally Pitt & Israel, Implied Rights: While ALI Debates,
Court Eviscerates,Legal Times of Wash., Dec. 3, 1979.

88. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 580 (1979).
89. Id.
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fore, since "It] he remaining two Cort factors cannot by themselves be a basis for implying a right of action," 90 Justice
Brennan joined in the decision of the Court to deny the plaintiff's claim.
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, disagreed with limiting the
application of the Cort test to the face of the statute. He pointed
out that section 17(a) gives the SEC rulemaking power which it
had exercised in promulgating rule 17a-5. 91 This rule directed
accountants to verify the broker's financial reports. Since these
rules are passed for the protection of investors, and since
Touche-Ross violated the mandate of the SEC, Justice Marshall
concluded that a cause of action should be implied in favor of
the investor's representatives, the SIPC, and the trustee. Rejecting the Court's conclusion, he was unwilling to assume that
"Congress simultaneously sought to protect a class and de'92
prived (it) of the means of protection.
Touche Ross could be read as a case limited to its facts.
Since the source of the alleged implied cause of action was a
general bookkeeping provision found in numerous statutes, the
Court may simply have been trying to avoid a deluge of implied
cause of action cases. 93 Such a reading of Touche Ross, however,
is incorrect since the decision seems to build upon a theme only
hinted at in prior decisions-the Court would not read a statute
"more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably. permit. '94 This theme emerged once again in Trans95
america Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis.
CongressionalIntent is Controlling
In Transamerica,a shareholder of a real estate investment
trust filed three shareholder derivative suits and three class actions for violation of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 (Act).96
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the question of
whether sections 215 and 206 of the Act created a private cause
90. Id.
91.

17 CFR § 240.17a-5 (1980).

92. 442 U.S. at 582.
93. Such a reading could be inferred from the fact that Touche Ross did
not expressly overrule J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In Touche
Ross, Justice Rehnquist apparently endorsed Justice Powell's dissent
against implication in Cannon and noted that, although the Court would
"not now question the actual holding [of Borak], [it would] decline to read
the opinion so broadly that virtually every provision of the securities acts
gives rise to an implied cause of action." 442 U.S. at 577.
94. 442 U.S. at 578.
95. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-22 (1940).
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of action after the Ninth, Fifth, and Second Circuits had all held
97
that under the Cort test, a cause of action could be maintained.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by looking at the
plain language of section 215, which provides that contracts
whose formation or performance would violate the Act "shall be
void . . . as regards the rights of the violator and the knowing
successors in interest."98 Because the statute used the word
"void," the Court concluded that Congress impliedly intended
that a plaintiff could bring an action for rescission. Otherwise,
the Court would have had to conclude that, despite the word
"void," the legislative intent was that none of the legal consequences of voidness would follow. 99
Turning to section 206, upon which the plaintiffs' claims for
damages rested, the Court initially addressed the question as
one of statutory construction. Section 206 broadly prohibits
fraudulent practices by investment advisors, making it unlawful
for any investment advisor to "employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud. . . [or] to engage in any transaction, practice
or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon
any client or prospective client." 00 In view of the language and
legislative history the statute was clearly intended to benefit the
plaintiffs, clients of investment advisors. The Court, however,
applied the expressio maxim to deny any claim for damages relief under section 206.101
The Court stated that Congress had expressly provided judicial and administrative means to enforce the statute:
First, under § 217 willful violations of the Act are criminal offenses,
punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. Second, § 209 authorizes the Commission to bring civil actions in federal Courts to enjoin compliance with the Act, including, of course, § 206. Third, the
Commission is authorized by § 203 to impose various administrative sanctions on persons who violate the Act, including § 206.102
97. Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1978); Wilson v.
First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1978); Abrahamson v.
Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1940).
99. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979).
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated:
In the case of § 215, we conclude that the statutory language itself fairly
implied a right to specific and limited relief in a federal court. By declaring certain contracts void, § 215 by its terms necessarily contemplates that the issue of voidness under its criteria may be litigated
somewhere.
Id.
100. 15 U.S.C. 80b-6 (1940).
101. "When a statute limits a thing to be done in particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979), quoting Botany Mills v. United States,
278 U.S. 282 (1929).
102. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979).
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The Court concluded that it is highly improbable that Congress
inadvertently failed to mention an intended private cause of action in section 206. This reliance on the expressio maxim to bar
implication under section 206 seems inconsistent with the
Court's implying a right of action from section 215, since the
same reasoning should bar implication under the latter section.
The majority justified their holding on the basis of the Act's
jurisdictional provision, section 214. The Court noted that section 214 gave the federal courts jurisdiction "of all suits in equity
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by"10 3 the statute, but it was totally silent as to actions at law. Therefore, the
conclusion that private rights of action under the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940 are limited to actions for recission was consistent with legislative intent as interpreted by looking only at
the face of the statute.
Justice White, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, contended that the Cort test was stripped of
all force and effect. 10 4 He pointed out that recent decisions of
the Court had indicated that while implication questions were
limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to cretest are
ate a private right of action, the four factors in the Cort
10 5
the criteria "by which this intent must be discerned."
The dissenters argued that a proper application of the Cort
test in Transamerica clearly indicates Congress intended that
section 206 should create a private damage action. First, unlike
the course followed in Touche Ross, the majority conceded that
section 206 was enacted for the protection and especial benefit of
clients of investment advisors. 0 6 Under the second prong of the
Cort test, a court must look only for express or implicit legislative intent to deny any claimed right of action which had arisen
by presumption, since a duty was owed to members of an especial class. As the Court had previously held:
[T] he legislative history of a statute that does not expressly create
or deny a private remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the question. Therefore, in situations such as the present
103. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1940).
104. Justice White vigorously asserted that this decision cannot be rconciled with other decisons which recognized implied private actions for
damages under securities laws with substantially the same language. By
resurrecting distinctions between legal and equitable relief, the Court
reached a result that can only be considered anomalous. 444 U.S. at 25-26.
105. Id. at 27.
106. In Touche Ross Justice Rehnquist, speaking of the statutory provision at issue, said: "By its terms, § 17(a) is forward-looking, not retrospec-

tive; it seeks to forestall insolvency, not to provide recompense after it has
occurred. In short, there is no basis in the language of § 17(a) for inferring
that a civil cause of action for damages lay in favor of anyone." Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 570-71 (1979).
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one "in which it is clear that federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action, although an explicit
purpose to deny
10 7
such cause of action would be controlling."'
The majority found an explicit purpose to deny a cause of action
because the Act expressly provides for enforcement proceedings. As Justice White pointed out in the dissent, this finding
ignores the Court's previously consistent rejection of the notion
that express statutory remedies were exclusive, absent specific
support of exclusivity in legislative history. 10 8 Furthermore, a
conclusion predicated upon sections 217, 209, and 203 virtually
ignores the fact that identical administrative enforcement powers have previously been declared not to be exclusive. l0 9
The Court found an explicit purpose to deny a private cause
of action by the omission in the jurisdictional provision, section
214, of any reference to actions at law. This omission is entirely
irrelevant since private damage actions under section 206 can be
brought under general federal question jurisdiction."10 A further weakness in this position is that the question of whether a
litigant has a cause of action is analytically distinct from, and
addressed prior to, the question of what relief a litigant may be
entitled to receive."' The Court, in implication cases, has often
relied on language in Bell v. Hood" 2 which states that "where
legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for
a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use
any available remedy to make good the wrong done."11 3 Furthermore, where a Court's equitable jurisdiction has been properly invoked, "the Court has the power to decide all relevant
matters in the dispute and to award complete relief even though
the decree includes that which might be conferred by a court of
law.,,ll4
107. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 28 (1979),
quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975).
108. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 29 (1979)
(White, J., dissenting).
109. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S.185 (1976) (implied
cause of action under § 106 and Rule 10b-5 was held not to be barred by
express enforcement mechanisms in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
The plaintiffs argued in Transamerica that the same factual allegations
would support both a Rule 10b-5 claim and a § 206 claim under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1940).
111. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
112. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
113. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 30 (1979),
quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). See also Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
114. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 30 (1979).
See generally Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Porter v.
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Although in Touche Ross the Court ignored the third and
fourth prongs of the Cort test, Justice White, in his dissent, applied them to the facts in Transamerica.With regard to the Cort
standard of whether a private right of action would be consistent
with the legislative scheme, Justice White found that implication would not only be consistent, but it was essential to
preventing fraudulent practices by investment advisors. 11 Addressing the final consideration in the Cort test, whether the
subject matter of the implied cause of action has been so traditionally relegated to state law as to make implication inappropriate, Justice White found that only six states had enacted
legislation to regulate investment advisors. Of course, this argument does not give deference to the fact that in the majority of
states a common law action for fraud is available. Although federal intrusion into areas traditionally left to state law will not
lightly be inferred, the dissent noted that the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 was intended to set up federal fiduciary standards which would result in preemption of state power to
enforce remedies in areas co-terminous with the scope of fed116
eral statutes.
THE DECLINE OF IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION

Touche Ross and Transamerica completed the erosion of
the implied cause of action doctrine enunciated in Rigsby and
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946); Deckert v. Independence Shares
Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
115. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 34 (1979).
Justice White argued in dissent that in the absence of an implied cause of
action, victimized clients of investment advisors have little hope of ob-

taining redress for their injuries. Justice White also quoted Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 707-08 n.41 (1979), where an implied cause of
action was deemed appropriate because the especial beneficiaries of the
statute are not able to activate and participate in the administrative process
contemplated by the statute.
116. The central argument of the plaintiffs was that all the federal securities laws including the Investment Advisors Act constitute a comprehensive regulatory scheme aimed at the elimination of fraud, deception and
similar over-reaching. The settled propriety of implying a cause of action
under this regulatory scheme is clear; therefore, the failure to do so under
§ 206 constitute an unjustifiable anomaly.
It is no answer, plaintiffs argued, to say that because the claims stated
by the especial beneficiaries of the statute can be restated in terms of traditional common law, implication is barred under the fourth Cort factor. All
federal claims are necessarily built upon a framework of common law jurisprudence, and there are few, if any, claims for relief that could not be restated in common law form with a mere modicum of semantic imagination.
The existence of such available analogies has not prevented the federal
courts from recognizing and implying appropriate federal rights, whether
under the securities laws such as in Borak, or under the laws of trespass
such as in Wyandotte Trans. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967). Brief
for Respondent, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11
(1979).
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Borak. In Rigsby, a presumption in favor of implication was
created by operation of the statutory tort principle if the plaintiff, injured by a violation of a statute, was a member of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute had been enacted. In
Touche Ross, the Court stated that any reliance on tort principle
in implication cases is misplaced. 117 In Transamerica, even
though the plaintiff was a member of the especial class, he was
required to show additional legislative intent before a cause of
action would be implied in his favor. These decisions represent
a clear signal that any presumption previously recognized in the
law in favor of an implied remedy no longer exists.
Similarly, nothing remains of the rationale articulated in
Borak." 8 Borak's holding expressed a realization that federal
courts were in the position to observe the operation of enforcement schemes provided in enactments of Congress. If the enforcement provisions were inadequate to fulfill the substantial
social policy embodied in an act of positive law, the Courts
should fill in the gaps by allowing private enforcement through
the means of implied causes of action. 119 But, the Court firmly
stated in Touche Ross, that it was not the duty of the federal
judiciary to fill any voids left by the legislature in a statutory
scheme. 120 Therefore, in Transamericathe Court rejected the
argument proffered by the plaintiff that the statute at issue constituted part of a comprehensive enforcement scheme aimed at
the elimination of fraud and deception in the securities industry
which made implication of a remedy under a substantive antifraud provision necessary to fully effectuate the statute's purpose.121
117. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
118. In Carlson v. Green, 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980), Justice Rehnquist stated:
IT] he exercise of judicial power involved in Borak simply cannot be
justified in terms of statutory construction. . . nor did the Borak Court

purport to do so. The notion of 'implying' a remedy, therefore, as applied to cases like Borak, can only refer to a process whereby the federal judiciary exercises a choice among traditionallyavailablejudicial
remedies according to reasons related to substantive social policy embodies [sic] in an act of positive law. . . . In light of this Court's recent
decisions in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, it is clear that nothing is left of the rationale of
Borak.
Id. at 1482 n.5 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis original).

119. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 426-28 (1964).
120. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979).
121. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24
(1979) (the central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create,
either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action). The Court has
reduced the Cort test from a method by which the appropriateness of impli-
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The judicial rationale used in Touche Ross and Transamerica represents a new analytical framework under which the
Court has eliminated implied rights. 122 The securities field is
currently the most unlikely area where the Court will recognize
any new implied rights. While the Court seems willing to con123
tinue to recognize damage actions under both sections 10(b)
and 14(a) 124 of the Securities Exchange Act, and specifically
rules 10b-51 25 and 14a-91 26 thereunder, its acknowledgment of
these actions reflects nothing more than a tenuous and poten27
tially shortlived deference to stare decisis.1 This is especially
true since prior decisions which allow such actions to be implied
tort principle, are inconsistent with the
under the statutory 128
analysis.
Court's new
cation could be determined to merely several factors which have somewhat
limited utility in interpreting legislative intent.
122. The following cases used the Cort test in light of Touche Ross and
Transamericato determine if an action should be implied: CETA Workers
v. City of N.Y., 617 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1980) (no implied action under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1978); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980) (no implied action under § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir. 1979) (no
implied action under Nat'l Housing Act of 1934); Cedar-Riverside Assoc.,
Inc. v. Minneapolis, 606 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1979) (no implied action under
New Housing Act of 1968); City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling,
Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979) (no implied cause of action under either
Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899, Fed. Water Pollution Control Act Amends. of
1972, or Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974); Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646
(D.P.R. 1979) (no implied action under Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899); Collyard v. Washington Capitals, 477 F. Supp. 1247 (D. Minn. 1979) (no implied
action under Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Sobel v. Yeshiva
Univ., 477 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (no implied action for employees of
university under Title IX of the Educ. Amends of 1972); Western Colo. Fruit
Growers Ass'n, Inc. v. Marshall, 473 F. Supp. 693 (D. Colo. 1979) (no implied
action under Wagner-Peyser Act of 1970); National Super Spuds, Inc. v.
New York Mercantile Exch., 470 F. Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (no implied
action under Commodity Exch. Act of 1924).
Two cases, decided prior to Transamerica, found an implied cause of
action: Demoe v. Dean Witter & Co., 476 F. Supp. 275 (D. Alaska 1979) (allowed an implied action under § 17(a) of Securities Act of 1933); Zeffiro v.
First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 473 F. Supp. 201 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (implied action under Trust Indenture Act of 1939).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) b (1976).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) a (1976).
125. 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1980).
126. 17 CFR § 240.14a-9 (1980).
127. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (cause of
action under § 106 and Rule 10b-5); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)
(cause of action under § 14a and Rule 14a-9).
128. The Court seems to be determined to end implication under a "tort
principle." However, it is not so clear that implication under civil rights is
dead. Several implication cases found an implied cause of action in favor of
black employees, to remedy discrimination, under the Railway Labor Act.
See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman & Engineman, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
Twenty-five years passed before the next civil rights case, Allen v. State Bd.
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Under the new framework of analysis, the Court will approach an implication issue as merely a question of statutory
construction. Under this method, the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius-the expression of one thing is the exclusion
of another-creates a negative presumption against implication
by the mere fact that some sections of the statutory scheme provide for express remedies. 12 9 This presumption can only be
overcome by a showing of clear legislative intent to allow implied actions.
To find such legislative intent, the Court will apply the Cort
test. The first prong of the Cort test requires a determination
that the plaintiff is a member of the class which is the primary
beneficiary of the statutory provision. This determination now
must be made from the face of the statute. 130 Even if the plaintiff is found to be a member of the especial class, both legislative
history and legislative purpose will be scrutinized for evidence
of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to deny a cause of ac13 1
tion.
of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), allowed an implied cause of action, this
time under the Voting Rights Act. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), permitted an implied cause of action for 1800 Chinese-speaking children under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. What makes Lau so interesting is that it
was decided just twelve days after Amtrak. This seems to indicate that
even though the Court was trying to restrict implication in tort areas, it was
expanding implication in the civil rights area.
The Court's rationale may be that, in the traditional implication area of
"tort principles" only property rights are being protected, whereas in civil
rights, the Court is concerned with the protection of personal rights granted
by the Constitution or the Civil Rights Act. This rationale is evident in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (allowed a private action under the fifth
amendment); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-93 n.13
(1979); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (allowed a private action to
challenge state welfare enactments); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (allowed a private
action for violation of the fourth amendment). See generally Note, Implied
Rights of Action to Enforce Civil Rights: The Casefor a Sympathetic View,
87 YALE L.J. 1378 (1978).
This approach in allowing private rights under civil rights has not
flowed over to the personal rights of the handicapped. Lower courts have
been receptive to allowing private actions under the Rehabilitation Act, but
the Supreme Court has not as yet decided the issue. The Court had a
chance to determine if the Rehabilitation Act implied a cause of action in
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). Instead of
deciding if the Act provides for a private action, the Court refused to express a view.
129. See Pillai, Negative Implication: The Demise of PrivateRights of Action in the Federal Courts, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1978). For criticism of
the expressio maxim see HART & SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (temp. ed.
1958) which rejects the usefulness of the expressio maxim.
130. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979).
131. Id. at 694.
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Inasmuch as legislative history is often silent on the issue of
implied remedies, 132 the Court will look to the express remedies
provided by Congress and to the jurisdictional provision to infer
legislative intent to deny relief. The Court will presume that in
no case did Congress want the courts to imply a broader remedy
than provided expressly in the statute. 133 Hence, if the jurisdictional provision of a statute fails to empower district courts to
hear actions at law arising from breach of the statute, the Court
will conclude that Congress intended that no damage action be
13 4
implied.
If no congressional intent can be found to deny relief from
the legislative history or the express remedy provisions in a
statutory scheme, the Court then will apply the remaining two
prongs of the Cort test. The third prong requires that the implied cause of action be consistent with the legislative purpose.
The Court will reject any argument that implication will be helpful to the statutory purpose, and hence will only use this prong
of the test to deny a cause of action where the enforcement of a
statute has been vested in an administrative agency or other enforcing authority. 135 Finally, the Court will apply the fourth
Cort factor, whether the subject matter of the cause of action
has been traditionally relegated to state law. This prong has
been interpreted to require a court to presume that any gaps in
congressional enforcement schemes were intended to be filled
13 6
by action in the state courts.
The new analytical framework clearly creates an atmosphere unfavorable to implication of private causes of action. Unable to rely upon the statutory tort principle to provide a
presumption in favor of an implied cause of action, a plaintiff
132. Id.
133. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979). See also
Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1118 (1980).
134. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
This aspect of the Transamerica holding was strongly criticized in Justice
White's dissent. Id. at 32-33. Furthermore, the mere fact that the legislature did not amend the jurisdictional provision to include actions at law
should not be deemed dispositive of legislative intent to foreclose any implied causes of action in that "mute intermediate legislative maneuvers"

have inherent limitations as accurate indicators of legislative intent. Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 61 (1947). The only accurate sources of
legislative history are the House and Senate Reports which accompany the
legislation to the floor of the Congress. United States v. International
Union, UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957); American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil
Aeronautics Board, 365 F.2d 939, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (those are perhaps the

only documents which can be presumed to have been considered by Congress as a whole).
135. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24
(1979).
136. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576-79 (1979).
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has little chance of persuading any court using the new analysis
to imply such a cause of action.
An exception to this judicial roadblock would be in the case
of a statute which the Court had previously ruled upon before
having adopted the stricter standard. A cause of action under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act would fall into this
category. Another probable exception would be in situations
where there was clear evidence in the legislative history of a
statute favoring implication. This would be a situation analogous to Cannon v. University of Chicago137 where the Court implied a remedy under Title IX of the Education Amendment of
1972. This Title was determined to have been patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under which the Court had
previously implied a cause of action. Under these narrow circumstances the Court still seems willing to recognize that Congress was relying on the Court's previous decisions in passing
new legislation in which express remedial provisions were not
included.
CONCLUSION

The new analytical framework cryptically set forth in
Touche Ross and Transamericais not really a test for resolving
the question of whether an action should be implied from a statute which does not expressly provide for one. Rather, it is an
alarming step taken by a slim majority of the Supreme Court
Justices 13 8 who wish to see implication eliminated from federal
law. To illustrate that the new analytical framework is a prenew criteria will be applied
ordained result posing as a test, the
139
to the facts in Chumney v. Nixon.
The plaintiff, Vern Chumney, was assaulted by several passengers while in transit aboard an aircraft which was within the
special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. 140 Chumney
contended that the defendants violated a criminal statute which
provides criminal penalties for personal assaults perpetrated on
board aircraft. Therefore, he sought to recover compensatory
damages on the theory that violation of the statute gives rise to
an implied cause of action for said damages.
137. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
138.

There was a 5-4 split in Transamerica. Justices who are in favor of

completing the evisceration of the doctrine of implication are Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist.
139. 615 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1980).
140. 49 U.S.C. § 1301(34) (d) (1974) defines the special aircraft jurisdiction
of the United States.
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The aircraft assault statute14 ' was passed to protect the
safety of passengers aboard United States aircraft. 142 Therefore,
Chumney, injured while an aircraft passenger, is one of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted. Addressing
the question under either Rigsby's statutory tort principle or the
Cort test, the existence of an especial class creates a presumption in favor of granting Chumney a private right of action. Similarly, under the Amtrak analysis, the existence of an implied
action for damages would be consistent with the statute's clearcut purpose of protecting passengers in transit by discouraging
assaults on board aircraft. Moreover, under a Borak rationale,
implication is necessary for effectuating the statute's purpose in
that other possible factual situations such as aircraft kidnappings or terrorism cry out for more than a criminal penalty as a
deterring factor. Since the legislative history is silent on implied actions and no other indicia of legislative intent to deny
implied actions can be found, the rationale of the implication
cases-until Touche Ross and Transamerica-would hold that
Chumney's complaint states a cause of action.
Under the new test set forth in Touche Ross and Transamerica, Chumney's complaint would be dismissed. This new analytical framework denies plaintiffs the benefit of the
presumption in favor of implication arising out of the statutory
tort principle. Instead, the burden falls on the plaintiff to show
congressional intent to create an implied cause of action; legislative history's total silence on implied actions gives Chumney an
insurmountable burden of proof. Furthermore, because the
statute provides an express criminal penalty, application of the
arbitrary maxim of statutory construction: expressio unius est
exclusio alterius-expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another-would provide sufficient implicit evidence of congressional intent to deny an implied cause of action. Therefore, even
if Chumney could find some evidence of legislative intent in his
favor, he would be denied relief.
The result of analysis under the new analytical framework
designed by the Court in Touche Ross and Transamericaalways
will be to deny implied causes of action. 143 A slim majority of
141. 18 U.S.C. § 113(d) (1976).
142. Chumney v. Nixon, 615 F.2d

389, 394 (6th Cir. 1980).
143. Some courts do not believe that the Court has developed a new analytical framework. See, e.g., CETA Workers Organizing Committee v. City
of New York, 617 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1980). The court noted:
This does not mean, we take it, that cases such as the landmark J. L
Case Co. v. Borak in the securities area, Cannon v. University of Chicago in the discrimination area, or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics in the constitutional area are
somehow sub silentio overruled. Rather, we suppose the Court is send-
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the Court is clearly sending Congress a signal that no longer will
the Court fill the gaps in legislative enforcement schemes or aid
over-burdened administrative agencies to effectuate a statute's.
goal. This majority, by closing the door on implied causes of action, is saying that rights created by federal statutes are limited
in scope and can be enforced only in the manner expressly set
forth in the legislation. 14 The failure to compensate victims of
statutory violations not only sanctions injustice, but cannot
stand in a nation where the "essence of civil liberty" is ex145
pressed in the tenet: where there is a right, there is a remedy.
Robert L. Carter
James E. Cumberworth Jr.

ing to Congress and the lower courts a message that, in future statutory
drafting, more explicitness will be required than was present in these
cases. The Court seems to be hitting this political ball back into Congress's court. (citations omitted).
Id. at 932 n.3.
. Also, in Chumney v. Nixon, 615 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1980), the court believed it to be an appropriate step to imply a cause of action in favor of the
plaintiff. In reaching its result the court applied the Cort test as originally
drafted despite citing both Touche Ross and Transamerica. Such a finding
is simply incongruous with the new analytical framework the Supreme
Court enunciated in its recent decisions.
144. This seems to follow the dubious logic of Justice Rehnquist in Arnett v. Kennedy 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (The Court could be interpreted as saying that the source of all rights is government and therefore government
can limit rights.).
145. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).

